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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS DANKS,

Pla.i ntif f-A ppellant,

-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warrl.en,
)
Utah State Prison,
Dcfondant-Rrsponde11t.

Case No.
10513

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NA 11 URE OF CASE

The appellant, Thomas Danks, a prisoner confined
in the Utah State Prison, appeals from a judgment of
the District Court of the Second .J ndieial District, Weber
County, denying his application for writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On November 10, 1965, the appellant filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of 'Veber

1

County, State of Utah, alk•ging that his eounsel during
the course of his trial on till• <'hargf' of robb0ry was incompetent, and alleging, furtht'r, that there was new
evidence which would prove hii'i innoct>nce. A hearing
was held on December 10, EJGC>, at which time the court
denied the appellant's 1wtition for writ of habeas rorpus
and remanded the appellant to tlw custody of the Warden of the Utah StatP Prison. ::.\ o final order was ever
entered by the district court denying the appellant's
petition for writ of habeas corpus. A notice of appeal
was filed by the appellant, and l\lr. J imi .Mitsunaga, the
legal defender of Salt Lah County, was appointed as
his counsel. Thereafter, a dispuh• arose bf>tween the appellant and .Mr. Mitsunaga, l\I r . .Mitsunaga withdrew
and Mr. Sheldon A. Vincenti, his pres<:'llt attorney, was
appointed to represent him.

REILIEF SOUGHT OK APPEAL
Respond1mt submits that thl' appPal should be dismissed for lack of a final order, or, in the alternative,
the decision of the trial court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of

facts:
The only issue rai~ed in the appellant's brief is that
the trial court PrrNl in not appointing eounsel for him
to repr<:>sent him on his motion for new trial after his
trial on the chargP of robbery.
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1

The appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas
corpus alleging two grounds for relief: ( 1) incompetent
counsel and (2) newly discovered evidence (R. 1). The
trial court at the time of }waring agreed that the contention that the appellant did not have counsel at the
time o.f his motion for new trial was not a part of the
petition, but allowed tht> appellant to raise the issue
(rrr. 66). The record disclo8e8 that there has never been
a final order entered denying the appellant's application
for writ of habt>as corpus. The only thing in the record
indicating that the motion was denied is the court's
statement in the tram;cript, page 75, and a minute entry
(R. 7).
A transcript of the testimony and proceedings at
the time of the appellant's motion for new trial does not
appear of record. Appellant was rPpresented at the time
of his trial at preliminary lu•aring by Mr. Philip S. KennPy. A tram;cript of the proc1·edings subsequent to preliminary hearing indicates that at the time of the appellant's arraignment, he indicated that he wanted .Mr. Kenney to withdraw and that Mr. Kenney withdrew and that
thereafter, the court appointed :Mr. L. G. Bingham.
.Mr. Bingham testified that he had consulted with
Mr. Danks, but had stated he did not take the case since
Mr. Danks ''ms unwilling to pay him (Tr. 58), and that,
thereafter, the court appointed him as counsel to represent Mr. Danks. Mr. Bingham represented the appellant
throughout the trial. At the time of hearing, Mr. Danks
testified:
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· "Q.

Now after the jun- found you guilt~' on ,J nnr·
24:, of 1959, was Mr. Bingham your attorner
after that ?
·

A.

No. I went down to the prison, and I filed a
motion for re-trial lwfore .T udge Cowley.

Q.

Who filed a motion?

A.

I did.

Q.

Had you fired Mr. Bingliam at that time?

A.. \Vell the jur:- trial was over.
Q.

Yes.

A.

And I thought that was over and done with
between him and llll', you know. Then I filed
my own motion for a re-trial that came befon~ Judge Cowley, I felt Mr. Bingham was

incompetent, and Mr. Cowlelj appointed Mr.
·Bingham to rcprl';-;!'11t 111c on my motion fnr
n re-trial. I fire.cl illr. Bingham, asked him
to withdraw fro111 the case, asked .Judge
Cowley to gPt 111<' anotlwr attorney. H <' said
well you're hen>, and we will hear the argu-

ment now. He didn't give me another attorney."

The court
express!:· found . with n'f erence to the
.
motion for new trial (Tr. 73):
"So far as the motion for new trial, the Court '
chooses to beliew Tonm1Y Danks tf>stimonv that
he did request that anoth~r counsel be app~inted.
The Court heliPYPS that mH·e being supplied with
counsel for trial sn far as the Court i:;; aware
this counsel has been lo:·al to him and attempter1
to do the be8t he could, and that his counsel was
competent. The Court believes nmY that the defendant is not required tn have counsel at an
1
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argument for rn·\\· trial and doP:-:; not beliPve that
thf' rPquirenwnt i:-:; denovo and doe:-; not believe
that tlw Conrt has to g-ivP to the dPf Pndant who
has dis<'hargPd c·om1s.. J, oncP appointed, compeh>nt to serw and who is discharged without any
apparent canst", ,,·ith a ne\\· counsel."
There is no evidence as to whether the motion for
new trial was time!>· filt><l. ln addition, at the tiu1p of the
appellant's application for \Hit of habeas corpu:-:;, the
court }u•ard all tlw :-:;o~called 1wwly discovered evidence,
including the tc:-:;tirnony of .:\Ir. Bill ~ubold, the complaining ~witnes:-:;. Thert· was, in d'fe<'t, a eomplete re-trial
of thP ea:-:;e on tlw question of whdher there was any
newly dit-ieovered evideIH'f'. The court ruled that there
was no showing of any 1wwly diseoverl'd evidt·nce so as
to grant rPlief by habeas eorpus. 1
Ba8ed on the above evidt·11ee, tlw trial court orally
clenil'd the pl'tition for \nit of habeas corpu:-:;.

ARGli~lEKT

POINT I.
APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
SINCE NO FINAL ORDER DENYING HIS APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS HAS
BEEN ENTERED.
1

The trial court was in error in considering the question
of newly discovered evidence by habeas corpus, since
this only applies for consideration on an application for
coram nobis. However, the issue is not germane to this
appeal, except to show that the appellant was afforded a
full opportunity to present his evidence.
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The record does not dernonstrah> that there wa~
any final order Pntered h:v the l Ttah ('Ollli denying the
appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus. It i~,
of <'ourse, the cm;tom for eonns<'l to pn-'pare an ordrr
for the eourt to execuh'. I lo\H'YPr, in tlie absence of a
final order, there can lw no ap1ieal to this court.

In Aldridge v. Beckstead, 1() l'.:2d 136, :396 P.2d 870
( 1964), an appeal was takPn from an allPg<-'d denial of a
writ of habeas eorpus in an l'Xtradition prcweeding. rn1i8
court noted that there had lire11 110 fi11al order e11tercd

and stated:

"The record before us refh,ds no final appealable
judgment. Thus, our juris(liction fails."

It is subrnitt>d, therefon•, that thl' instant appeal '
should be disrnissPd on tlH' g-rounds that there has been
no final onll-'l' entt>red in th(' trial court.

POINT

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
THE APPELLANT'S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE
DID NOT HA VE COUNSEL AT THE TIME OF
HEARING ON HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
SINCE CA) THE APPELLANT HAD HAD COUNSEL
APPOINTED IN HIS BEHALF AND UNJUSTIFIABLY DISCHARGED HIM, AND CONSEQUENTLY,
THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL, CB) THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS TIMELY
FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UTAH CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, <C) THE SAME IS-
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SUES WHICH WERE APPARENTLY PRESENTED
IN THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WERE HEARD
BY THE TRIAL COURT ON H./\.BEAS CORPUS AND
FOUND TO BE WITHOUT MERIT, AND (DJ THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DO NOT INDICATE THAT THERE WAS A CRITICAL STAGE
REQUIRING THE AI'POINTl\IENT OF COUNSEL.

A. The record in this eaf'e clearly discloses that the
trial court did not conuuit t•rror in failing to appoint
another attorney for the appdlant to argue his motion
for a new trial. Appellant had eoum;t'l at the time of his
preliminary hearing and at the time of his anaignment
in the district court, dischargPd counsel. He told Judge
Cowley that lw did not desire a ''eivil attorney", but he
' wanted collllSPl who would n·prest>nt him in the manner
hP wantf~d to lw rt>pn•sPnkd. ;\lr. Danks had, himself,
previously contacted j\( r. Bingham ahom representation,
hut apparently, lweaUSP or lack of fumh;, ~Ir. Bingham
, was unwilling to take the case. ,Judgt' Cowley thereafter
appoinh'd 1\1 r. Bingham to rPpr<'sent the appellant.
Thus, appellant had appoinfr<l colmsel of his own ehoice.
Subsequent to the time of trial, by the appellant's own
admission, he dischargPd l\fr. Bingham, when Judge
Cowley said hP would make ~lr. Bingham available to
argue the motion. ThP trial eourt expressly found that
' there was no justifiable basis for thP discharge.
1

lTnder these circumstances, the appellant is m no
position to complain about the absence of counsel. Coun~rl who was most familiar with the ease and who would
haw hePn of assi:;;t<uwe to tlw appellant in presenting
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his motion for new trial was fi l'(•d h>· the appellant. ,
There is no unending duty on tlw part of the court to
continue to apvoint counsel aft(•r the defrndant in a ca~e
unjustifiably fires counsel.

1

1t is well svttled that thp right to appointed coumel ,
does not include with it tlw right of the defendant to
dictak his ehoice of eolmsPl. Tlw ehoice of counsel is
for the court. Prtitio11 of Correla, 352 P.2d Gl6 (Hawaii
1960) ; l Tula rd<' 1.·. Pen ple, ;)!l!) P.2d 2-!5 (Colo. 1965).

In People 1·. Henley, 2 ~lich. App. 5-!, 138 N.W. 2d
515 (1965), the .Michigan Court of Avp(~ah; ruled that
where the defendant ha<l had three• appointed counsel
and discharged tlwm, that it "as not neepssary
. for the ,'
trial court to appoiu t additional eounsel for the defendant.
1

,

In Arellanes i:. U11ited States, 3:l3 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1965), the court ruled that w hl'l'l' the defendant had maneuvered himself into a position that lw was without counsel, and it appeared that the adion was deliberate on the
part of the defendant, dnc proePss was not denied by
the failurl' of the defendant to have eounsel.

In Rogers v. U 11ited Stutes, 3:2G F.2d 485 (10th Cir.
1963), the court said, s1Jeaking of the right of a defendant to have counsel appointed to assist him:
"But he has no right to continued service, nor to
counsel of his choice, nor to dictate the procedural
coun:p of his representation."
In People i. l'alJb, .319 P.~d 656 (Cal. App. 1957),
the California court said:
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1

''A~suming for th0 rnonwnt that tlw appellant is
enhtlPd to have a C'ourt appointed attorney to
~rnsi1;t him in his appPal, he surely is not entitled
to have thP C'ourt appoint one attornev after anotht>r nntil an attornt>y wholly satisfac.tory to appPllant is iwlected. No :·m('lt a proc!::dure was ever
contemplated in the law."

In State

i:.

Ri11aldi, 156 A.:2cl 28, 58 N.J. Super. 209

(1959), it was stated:
" ... It i1; P11011gh that t}w attornt'!. assigned to tl10
appeal is qualified to rt->pre::-;ent the prisoner, and
that hP has advi1;ecl with him and done whatever
possihlP to repn'sPn t him C'Olllf H'tentl~·. Coum;el
is not required to danee to the prisoner's tune.
Those unfortunat<' <'nough to lw caught up in tlw
web of the law and who, mistakenly or not, considl'r thf'ms0lvPs aggri<>v0d must disabuse themselves of th0 notion now pn'vailing in C'ertain
prison circles that thPy Illa~' accept or rejeet assig-ned eonnsel, as whim or scheme dictates. The
right to assigned counsel is not the right to pick
an attorn<>y of on0's own <'hoosing, nor the right
to sel0d (•otmsel who "·ill ('Ompletely satisfy a
defendant's fancy as to how he is to be represented."

In the Rinaldi case, the rourt ruled that where a defendant fired his appointed appellate counsel, he was
not thereafter entitled to the appointment of new counsel.
The Rinaldi case was cited with ~ipproval by the
United States Court of Appeals in United States v.

Bell, 11 ·U.S.C.M.A. 306, 29 C.M.R. 122 (1960), in an
opinion by J ndge Latimer The court stated with refer-
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ence to action on the part of a defrndant m refm;in"
counsel:
I")

"H owt:>ver, if an acewwd protesb against such an '
ordPr and insists on firing his appointed lawyer.~,
he cannot later <'Olllplain if th<> hoard conclude,
not to rPquin• c·mmsPI 1o n•main in the case, for
an acens<>d who is saiw ean alwavs forfeit his
right to reprPsmtation lH'f'ore th1· board, and actions showing an arhit rar~· and <·alculated rpfusal
to aecPpt appointed <·ounsPl ma~- c·om;titutc an
abandonmPnt of that right"
1

In the instant cast·, thl' appellant had diseharged
appan•ntly without just eau;.;e hoth of his prior attorney::;. The trial court in thi;.; ca;.;<' found that the dischargP was unwarrankd. l. nd!•r tlwse c·ircmm;tanccs, it '
must be con<'ludPd that th1· ap1wllant forfeitf'd his right
to representation by appointed c•oum;el at the time of
hi::; motion for a new trial.
B. The record in the instant ease is silent as to '
whether the motion for a nf'w trial was even within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
f.;ection 77-38-+, l; tah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that the application for a Ill'W trial must be made
upon written notice of motion dP;.;ignating the grounds
upon which it is made and mm:;t he filed within five days
after the rendition of the verdict or dPcision. If it is
based upon a contPntion of newl~· dii:;covered evidence,
affidavits are rt'fJ.Uired. Since the appellant in this case
did not demonstratE:- that his motion met the jurisdic·
tional prerequisih>c', it cannot be said that the trial court
committNl an~ nror m refusing to f'ntertain his writ
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of habeas corpus on thP basis of lack of eounsel at the
time of his motion for new trial.
C. In the ease of State '" Danks. 10 L:.2a 162, 350
P.2d HG (1960), the prc8ent appellant'~ case was reviewed by this court and affirn1tid. The appellant was
represented by Mr. Walter R. Ellett. r:L'he court found
the evidence sufficient 38 a rnatter of law to ~mstain the
evidence. 2

The appellant at the time of his hearing on his
petition for writ of habeas corpus was represented by
counsel and was given an opportunity to vresent all the
newly discovered evidenc<> he contended would warrant
a new trial. The appellant's father was called as a witness, the victim of the robbery, imuate8 from the Prison,
police officern and other iwrson8. Ln effrd, tlw appellant
was grantPd a complPte rPhParing on his ease. The presentation of the l•videnc<• and the exploration of the
iss1u's on habeas corpus suhstantiall~· exceeded that
which would hav<' bPPU available for determination on
a motion for nP\\' trial. Appellant, therefore, had available to him at the tilllt' of trial in tlw proc<'eding from
which he now appeals all tlw opportunity to present evidence that he would havP had on hi:-; motion for a new
trial, and he was represented by able counsel. ConseCjUP~tly, it cannot he said that tlH· denial of coum;el at
the time of the motion for new trial nmv warrant8 relief
by habeas eorpus.
2

It is interesting to note that the absence of assigned
counsel at the motion for a new trial was not assigned
as error on appeal.
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In Myers v. Hadley, lG F:2rl +OJ, +02 P.:2d 701 (1960),
this eourt h0ld that an indivirlual in an C'xtradition prnceeding was not denied hi:-; eonstitutional right to coum;el
where he appean~d hefore a <'ity court \vithout counsel
when on a subsequent district rnnrt hearing on petition
for writ of hab1:1as corpus h<' \ms afforded a full opportunity with the aid of coum-wl to present all matters
concerning his extradition. Thi:::; eourt :,,;tated:
"Plaintiff was not denied due pro<'PSS of law because he was not reprPsPnted hy eourt-appointed
<'OUns<'l at the !waring hl:'fore tlw Ogden City
Court. 'l'he denial of conn:-;Pl at that stage of the
proeePdings did not pn'.iudieP Ow plaintiff who
had full opportunity to }H'P:-;ent with the aid of
counsl:'l any and all rnatt(•rs relating to his extradition at th<· h('aring- in th<' district court upon
his pdition for writ of habPas corpus.
Affirmed."

In State u. Bitrke, 28 Wis. 2<l 1!:13, J:)6 N.\V. ~d 829 I
(1965), the \Visconsin Nupre111p Court ruled that where !
a defendant had not bPl'n provided c·ounsel at his mental
commitment procPeding in 19~l~l, that granting him counsel at a habeas corpus !waring in \\-hich the same matters
were presented in 196+, eorreeted any defect.
Consequently, it is submitted that the habeas corpus '
proceeding in this ca:-;c cured any defect by the failure
of the appellant to haw counsel appointed at his hearing
on his motion for a new trial. l<~tipPeially is this true in
view of thP fact that thif' eourt thoroug-hl~- eonsidered thl'
same issll<'S on a11pcal and found them unmeritorious.
1
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D. It may be that a motion for new trial may become a critical stage in a proceeding and that a defendant may be entitled to courn:;el, if, becaGse o.f the nature
of the motion for new trial and the issues raised, the
necessity of counsel is manifest. Bland v. Alabama, ..... .
F.2d ______ (5th Cir. 12/27 /65) ; 2 Criminal Law Bulletin,
p. 39. However, it is submitted that in the nature of this
case, where the arguments were merely a rehash of the
evidence before the trial court and therP are no special
legal technicalities involved, that a motion for new trial
would not be a critical stage.
Recently, in Dirring 1-. [-11ite.d Stutes, 353 F.2d 519
(lst Cir. 1965), a claim was made that the trial court
erred in not appointing counsd to argue the petitioner's
motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The First Cireuit rejected the
contention, stating:
"There remains the question of whether the court
erred in failing to appoint <'ounsel to prosecute
the motion for new trial. Appellant had counsel
'through appeal,' as required by the Criminal
.Justice A<"t, 18 U.S.C. ~· 300(iA(c). 'Ve do not construe that phrase to includP motions for new trial.
Nor do we so interpret the Sixth Amendment.
There must be an end. Cf. United States v ..Johnson, supra. After final conviction the appointment of counsel must rest in the discretion of the
court. \Ve see no abuse of di::;cretion in this case.
Cf. United States <'X rd. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins,
2 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 707.
Affirmed."
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Consequent!~-, it is subrnited that when• in the in-

stant case the appt>llant had coun:wl at preliminary hear.
ing, eouns<>l at the tillH' of trial, <·ounsl'I on ap1wal, and
there was no demonstration that tlw appelant was not
otherwisP afforded full opportunity to present his evidence both at the time of his trial and on his petition for
writ of habea:-; eorpus, that it <·annot he said that there
is an:v basis for reversal lw<'aus1' of a failnn' to have
counsel at th1' time of a motion for new trial.

!

CONCLUSION
The instant appeal dPmonstrates that the appellant
is entitled to no n•lief. The soh• cont<>ntion is that the
appellant was not afforded c·ounsel at the time of his
motion for nP\V trial. Ap1JPllant had eounsl'l at the time
of preliminary hearing and disd1arged him. Appellant
had counsel at the ti1111• of trial and, thl'reafter, prior tu
his motion for new trial, disC'harged appointed counsel.
It was not incumbent upon tlw trial court to eontinue to
appoint one counsel aft1•r anotlwr to argue appellant's
case when there was no manifest demonstration that the
special intprests of jm;tice requi r<'cl new counsel. Fur· 1
ther, appellant was afforded full opportunity at the ,
time of his habeas corpus hearing to present issues on
the question of tlH• sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his conviction and newly discoverPd evidence. In addition, the appellant had an appeal and counsel reprP·
•
. I
sented him on appeal. This eourt found no merit to an> ·
of the contentiom on appeal.
1
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It is therefore submitted that there is no. basis for
reversal and that this court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted

PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
.\ttorneys for Respondent
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